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INTRODUCrION
How far does product liability go? Can a corn supplier be found
liable because a distillery used the supplier's corn to make whisky and
then sold the whisky to a bar that served a patron who drove home drunk
and injured someone? More realistically, can a manufacturer of a valve
or a chain be held liable when that multi-use component causes another
company's machine to operate unsafely?
* Partner, Lewis and Roca, Phoenix, Arizona. A.B. 1978, Harvard; J.D. 1982, Yale.
The author is grateful for the assistance of Barry Fish and Cathy Lesser Mansfield in the
preparation of this Article and is particularly indebted to Ross Schmucki for his many
theoretical and practical insights. This Article builds upon work which the author did
between 1992 and 1995 representing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company in a series of
cases arising out of DuPont's sale of raw materials to the manufacturer of an allegedly
defective medical implant. Mr. Schmucki directed the defense of those cases for DuPont
and this Article reflects his contributions, as well as those of others working on the cases.
Any errors, of course, are the author's, and the conclusions of this Article are solely the
author's personal views.
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This Article argues that there is, in fact, a largely unarticulated rule
that bars many product liability claims against multi-purpose raw material
and component suppliers. Specifically, unless the raw material or
component has a danger associated with most or all of its end-uses, its
supplier cannot be sued on a design defect or failure to warn theory. In
other words, if a multi-purpose raw material or component has been
properly manufactured and is hazardous only as used in a particular type
of finished product, legal responsibility rests with the finished product
manufacturer and not with the raw material or component supplier.
Although this limit on the liability of raw material and component
suppliers has received little attention, it is nonetheless consistently applied
to protect multi-use raw material and component suppliers from end-use-
specific claims.
The first part of this Article discusses how prevalent - and powerful
- this rule is.' Most significantly, it shields the raw material or
component supplier from liability even if it could have "foreseen" a
danger in the finished product. Part II of this Article explains why this
rule is appropriate from a public policy and economic perspective.2
Because multi-use raw materials and components can be put to so many
different applications, the costs of collecting and disseminating
warnings about specific applications can be high relative to the costs
of manufacturing the raw material or component. Requiring the
manufacturer to provide the information as a condition of selling the
product - as product liability law customarily does for finished product
manufacturers - may "price" the raw material or component out of the
market. In short, an analysis based on information costs demonstrates
that it would be unwise to hold the multi-use raw material or component
supplier liable, even if the danger in the finished product is foresee-
able.
The final part of this Article discusses the impact of the proposed
Third Restatement of Torts: Products Liability on the rule.3 In its current
tentative version, the proposed Third Restatement would arguably
establish a uniform standard of liability for all products - raw materials,
components, and finished products. This Article concludes that this is a
bad idea, and urges that existing legal protections for multi-use raw
material and component suppliers be expressly retained.4
'See infra notes 5-86 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 87-116 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 117-57 and accompanying text.
' See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
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I. THE BASIC LIMIT ON WARNING AND DESIGN CLAIMS
AGAINST RAW MATERIAL AND COMPONENT SUPPLimRS
A. The Limit Illustrated: The Childress and Crossfield Decisions
Courts and legislatures have often decreed that components are "prod-
ucts" for product liability purposes.' But this does not mean that
component and raw material suppliers are subject to the same liability
standards as finished product manufacturers. One who sells a chassis does
not have the same liability to an end-user as one who sells a truck.' Yet,
apart from recognizing that the standards are different, commentators
have often had difficulty explaining what those standards are.'
Many times, the potential liability of raw material and component
suppliers does not arise. By law, finished product manufacturers are
responsible for the safety of the products they sell, including components
and raw materials! The issue of component and raw material suppliers'
liability usually arises only when there is an indemnification or
contribution claim,9 the finished product manufacturer employed the
injured plaintiff,"0 the finished product manufacturer is insol-
5 SeegenerallylALouis IL FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 5.06, at 5-36 to 5-37 (1991).
6 See infra note 80.
7 For example, one annotation sets forth no clear rules on when a component
supplier has a duty to warn about the use of that component in another company's
finished product, but merely outlines a number of factors which courts consider when
making such decisions. These factors include: 1) the degree of danger associated with the
raw material or component itself; 2) the component manufacturer's knowledge of that
danger; 3) the foreseeability of such danger; 4) the user's knowledge of the danger; and
5) the obviousness of the danger. Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Products Liability:Duty
of Manufactureror Seller of Component Part Incorporated in Another Product to Warn
of Dangers, 39 A.L.R.4th 6, 13-14 (1985). The same approach is taken in AMERICAN
LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3d § 8:13, at 22-25 (Timothy E. Travers et al. eds., 3d ed.
1987), which contains a similar list of factors.
One of the few published commentaries on this subject, Scott G. Night, Comment,
Products Liability: Component Part Manufacturer's Liability for Design and Warning
Defects, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 215 (1988), characterizes the issue as "conceptually
difficult." Id. at 225, 239.
' See, e.g., Walton v. Avco Corp., 610 A.2d 454, 458-59 (Pa. 1992) (holding the
manufacturer of a helicopter responsible for the defective engine incorporated therein).
' See, e.g., Hill v. Wilmington Chem. Corp., 156 N.W.2d 898,900-01 (Minn. 1968)
(pertaining to an indemnity claim by a water repellent manufacturer against the supplier
of a flammable ingredient that caused the water repellent to ignite).
"o See, e.g., Kellar v. Inductotherm Corp., 498 F. Supp. 172, 176 (E.D. Tenn. 1978)
(involving a claim brought by a foundry worker against the supplier of a channel furnace
1995-96]
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vent," or the finished product manufacturer was not named as a
defendant before the statute of limitations ran out.' 2 Even then, rules
such as the bulk supplier/sophisticated purchaser rule 3 may limit the
liability of raw material suppliers.'
4
Some rules pertaining to component and raw material suppliers are
clear. When a component has been manufactured improperly, the supplier
may be sued for injuries caused by that manufacturing defect.'5 When
a "component" supplier is actually the designer of the finished product,
the supplier may be responsible for flaws in the finished product. 6 But
component to the foundry for injuries sustained on the job), aff'd, 633 F.2d 216 (6th Cir.
1980).
"; See, e.g., Bond v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 868 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1993) (involving a suit against a supplier of Teflon® raw materials to a medical
device manufacturer that later went bankrupt).
12 See, e.g., White v. Weiner, 562 A.2d 378, 379 n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (granting
summary judgment in favor of a bulk supplier of ingredients used to make a prescription
drug and finding a claim against the prescription drug manufacturer itself to be time-
barred), aff'd, 583 A.2d 789 (Pa. 1991).
"3 The bulk supplier/sophisticatedpurchaser rule states that a supplier is not liable for
failing to warn remote users where its product is shipped in bulk and subsequently
repackaged or reprocessed by a knowledgeable intermediary. Higgins v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 (D. Md. 1987); see also cases cited infra note
94.
'4 See, e.g., Higgins, 671 F. Supp. at 1061 (granting summary judgment to paint
manufacturer's bulk suppliers of glycol ether acetates stating: "There is no duty on
product suppliers to warn ultimate users (whether employees or customers) of product-
related hazards in products supplied in bulk to a knowledgeable user.").
"5 Zehring v. Wick Agri-Buildings, 590 F. Supp. 138, 143 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (purlin
"not of the grade and quality called for bythe standards"); Brizendine v. VisadorCo., 305
F. Supp. 157, 160-61 (D. Or. 1969) (finding that a glass pane was too thin and did not
meet specifications), aff'd, 437 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1970); Housman v. C.A. Dawson &
Co., 245 N.E.2d 886, 887 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (board with "knot cluster"); Penn v.
Inferno Mfg. Corp., 199 So. 2d 210, 218 (La. Ct. App. 1967) (bubbles in sight glass);
Magnuson by Mabe v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 844 S.W.2d 448, 455 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(wheel containing brittle steel); Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 305 N.E.2d 750,
751 (N.Y. 1973) (rotted and split lumber plank); Herman v. General Irrig. Co., 247
N.W.2d 472,478 (N.D. 1976) (oversized pistons); Walton v. Avco Corp., 610 A.2d 454,
462 (Pa. 1992) (defectively constructed helicopter engine); Burbage v. Boiler Eng'g &
Supply Co., 249 A.2d 563, 565 (Pa. 1969) (indentation in face of valve); Haugen v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 550 P.2d 71, 74 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (disc improperly
"heat-cured" during manufacture), supersededby statute on other grounds, Van Hout v.
Celotex, 853 P.2d 908 (Wash. 1993); City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc.,
207 N.W.2d 866, 869-70 (Wis. 1973) (defectively manufactured wheel).
16 See Miles v. Kohli & Kaliher Assocs., 917 F.2d 235, 245 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating
that defendant provided blueprints for the assembly of the finished product); DeSantis v.
Parker Feeders, Inc., 547 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding liable a defendant who
224 [Vol. 84
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what if the component or raw material was properly made, and the
supplier did not design the finished product?
In two recent cases, Childress v Gresen Manufacturing Co.,17 and
Cossfield v. Quality Control Equipment Co., 8 federal appellate courts
addressed this question. The plaintiff in Childress was seriously injured
when his legs were trapped in a log-splitter. He sued the supplier of a
multi-use valve used in the log-splitter, claiming that the valve enabled
the log-splitter to operate in an unsafe fashion, i.e., to recycle automati-
cally without a deadman's control. The district court granted summary
judgment for the valve supplier, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 9
The Sixth Circuit observed there was nothing "inherently dangerous
about the ... valve."2 Indeed, it "had previously been supplied to
manufacturers ... in which no allegation of danger had surfaced."'"
The plaintiff's claim, rather, was that it was dangerous as used in the log-
splitter because it had been "misapplied."2" The court concluded that
this claim was legally insufficient as against the valve supplier. In
explanation, the court stated:
"The obligation that generates the duty to avoid injury to another which
is reasonably foreseeable does not - at least yet - extend to the
anticipation of how manufactured components not in and of themselves
dangerous or defective can become potentially dangerous dependent
upon the nature of their integration into a unit designed, assembled,
supplied all of the components for the feeder so that defendant was, in effect, the
manufacturer of the feeder); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369,
373 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding liable a defendant who counseled and advised the fmished
product manufacturer concerning the proper formula to be used in its compound and
performed quality control tests on it); Sliman v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 731 P.2d 1267,
1268 (Idaho 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1031 (1988) (finding that defendant not only
supplied a component, but also designed the overall bottle-capping system).
Related to the cases set forth above are those cases in which the defendant furnished
a "raw material," but the plaintiff was injured handling that raw material, not another
product made from it. In those cases the raw material is really the "finished product." See,
e.g., Hammond v. North Am. Asbestos Corp., 454 N.E.2d 210, 213 (Ill. 1983) (involving
a plaintiff who was injured when he handled bags of raw asbestos while working in an
insulation factory).
17 888 F.2d 45 (6th Cir. 1989).
18 1 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 1993).
19 Childress, 888 F.2d at 48.20 id.
"' Id. at 47 (explaining that the valve had been used in fork lift trucks and garbage
bin dump trucks).
2 Id. at 49.
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installed, and sold by another" Therefore, we agree with the district
court that under Michigan law a component part supplier has no duty,
independent of the completed product manufacture; to analyze the
design of the completed product which incorporates its nondefective
component part.23
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar result in Crossfield.24 There the
plaintiff, injured when she caught her gloved hand in the chain of a
chitterling cleaning machine, sued the chain supplier. Like the plaintiff
in Childress, she argued that the chain was dangerous as used in the
machine.2 5 The Eighth Circuit, however, reversed a jury verdict for the
plaintiff. It noted that the component was not "in and of itself' defective
and concluded that the defendant did not have a duty to verify the safety
of finished products for which it supplied "non-defective component
parts. 26
Significantly, both defendants were exonerated in Childress and
Cmssfield even though, it appears, they should have known the hazards
of their components as used in the other companies' finished products. In
Childress, the Sixth Circuit assumed that the valve supplier had "knowl-
edge of its ultimate function in an allegedly dangerous finished prod-
uct."'27 In Crossfield, the chain supplier was not only aware of a
potential danger, it had redesigned the chitterling cleaning machine itself
to eliminate that hazard. 28 Nonetheless, the component suppliers
obtained judgment as a matter of law - even on the negligence claims.2 9
B. The Limit Explained: The Multi-Use Component and Raw
Material Rule
What is the basis for these decisions? Several possible explanations
that have appeared in court decisions and commentaries - "lack of
defect," "fitness for ordinary purposes," and "lack of knowledge" - can
be quickly rejected. It is simplistic and circular to say that the component
23 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Jordan v. Whiting Corp., 212 N.W.2d 324, 328
(Mich. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd in part on other grounds, 240 N.W.2d 468 (Mich. 1976)).
24 1 F.3d 701, 701 (8th Cir. 1993).
25Id. at 703.
26 Id. at 705-06 (quoting Childress v. Gresen Mfg. Co., 888 F.2d 45, 49 (6th Cir.
1989)).
27 Childress, 888 F.2d at 48.
28 Crossfield, 1 F.3d at 703.291 d. at 706-07.
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suppliers prevailed in Childess and Crossfield because their components were
'"nondefective." Such an explanation does not account for the dismissal of the
negligence claims, where "product defect" was not the issue. Moreover, a
product can generally be considered "defective' for strict liability purposes
when its manufacturer fails to warn about a danger associated with a
foreseeable use.3" In Crossfield the plaintiff argued precisely that.3 Thus,
a better rationale for the holdings in Childress and Crossfield is needed.
It is also not quite accurate to say that the component supplier's liability
turns on whether the component is "fit" or "unfit" for its ordinary purpos-
es.32 Even suppliers of components or raw materials that are "fit" for their
ordinary purposes - such as ethyl mercaptan which performs its ordinary task
of odorizing propane very well - can, nonetheless, be held liable for falling
to warn.33 "Fitness" is not the dispositive issue.
30 In Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prod. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1986), the
Fifth Circuit noted this very point. In that case, the plaintiff's decedent, a munitions
worker, was killed in a flash fire when his safety suit failed to protect him from serious
and ultimately fatal bums. His surviving spouse sued the manufacturer of the safety suit
for failing to warn about the suit's limitations. The suit manufacturer countered that it
had no duty to warn because it was merely a supplier of a nondefective component (a
safety suit), of a finished product (an overall safety system). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
rejected this argument and held that the lack of warning could itself be a defect. Id. at
715.
The "defective"-"nondefective" distinction has the same weakness when applied to
design defect claims. Generally, a product that works well in some applications but not
others can nonetheless be regarded as "defectively designed." That is because the
manufacturer may be responsible for a foreseeable, unreasonably dangerous misuse.
Hence, to say that a design defect claim may not be pursued against a supplier of a
component or raw material because the design of the component or raw material was not
"defective" begs the question of what is a "defect."
In any event, the outcome in Koonce, where the Fifth Circuit decided that the
plaintiff's claims against the suit manufacturer presented ajury question, was correct. The
safety suit was not truly a component at all, and certainly not a multi-purpose component.
It was, as the Fifth Circuit held, "a product with a discrete function." Id. See infra notes
37-39 and accompanying text.
31 See Crossfield, 1 F.3d at 703 ("Plaintiff's theory is that the chain was unreason-
ably dangerous for its reasonably anticipated uses (and thus defective) because it lacked
a warning stating that it could be hazardous when used in a chitterling cleaning
machine.").
32 W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 100,
at 705-06 (5th ed. 1984).
3' For example, judgment for defendant, as a matter of law, was rejected in the
following cases even though the component or raw material was "fit" for its ordinary
purposes and the component or raw material was being used for such purposes: Donahue
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008, 1009 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding a supplier of
ethyl mercaptan, used to odorize liquid propane gas, liable); Beauchamp v. Russell, 547
1995-96]
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Finally, it is incorrect to say that liability is a function of "knowl-
edge," i.e., whether the seller of the component had reason to know of its
end-use in an unreasonably dangerous finished product.34 Childress and
Crossfield hold that component suppliers are not necessarily liable even
for foreseeable misuses of their components by finished product
manufacturers.
Rather, the critical distinction is this: whether the component or raw
material presents a danger that accompanies most or all end-uses. If the
component or raw material has such a danger, then the supplier may be
required to guard against that danger, by designing around it or warning
about it. If, however, the component or raw material has no such general
use danger, because it is suitable for many end-products in which the
danger does not arise, then the safe use of the component or raw material
in the finished product becomes the finished product manufacturer's
responsibility. This is true even if the danger is arguably "foreseeable" to
the component or raw material supplier.
A recent decision by the Third Circuit, Fleck v KDI Sylvan Pools,"
captures the essential point. There, one of the defendants had manufac-
tured a replacement liner for a swimming pool that lacked depth markers.
The plaintiff, who became paralyzed when he dove into the pool without
realizing its depth, sued the liner manufacturer. On appeal the manufac-
F. Supp. 1191, 1200 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (denying summaryjudgment to a supplier of an air
valve used for pneumatically-driven machinery); Giordano v. Ford Motor Co., 299 S.E.2d
897, 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (denying a motion for summary judgment filed by the
supplier of a carburetor that was merchantable and reasonably suited to the general use
intended); Zacher v. Budd Co., 396 N.W.2d 122, 135-40 (S.D. 1986) (reversing a jury
verdict for the supplier of a wheel rim due to improper jury instructions); Rego Co. v.
Brannon, 682 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming a jury verdict for the
plaintiff against the supplier of a relief valve for a propane cylinder).
34 KEETON ET AL., supra note 32, § 100, at 706. The two cases that the authors cite in
support of this proposition are Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chem. Co., 524 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1975)
(applying Pennsylvania law), and Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (rex. 1976).
Suchomajcz is an exceptional case which must be considered limited to its facts by later
Pennsylvania decisions. In Suchomajcz, the critical facts, as set forth in the opening paragraph
of the court's opinion, were that the chemical ingredient supplier knew that its customer (a
fireworks manufacturer) was selling its fireworks kits illegally and in violation of a court
injunction. Suchomajfz, 524 F.2d at 22. As the court stated, "the social utility of knowingly
selling chemicals for illegal use is minimal ..... Id. at 25. On this basis, the court reversed
summary judgment for the ingredient supplier. See further discussion ofSuchomajcz, infra note
59.
Rourke is not a component case at all, but involved scaffolding that was inherently
defective because it lacked cleats. Rourke, 530 S.W.2d at 799.
31 981 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying Pennsylvania law), cert. denied, 123
L.Ed.2d 267 (1993).
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turer argued that it was merely a component part supplier and that the
danger arose only after the liner was incorporated into the pool and the
pool filled with water.3
6
The Third Circuit, however, divided the Pennsylvania precedents into
two categories: cases involving components which have "but one
purpose" and cases in which the component parts are "generic."'37 With
a component in the former category, a duty to warn may arise. With a
generic or multi-use component, however, "[i]t would be unreasonable
and unwarranted to recognize liability in such a tenuous chain of
responsibility."3 Thus, while the court affirmed the jury verdict against
the swimming pool replacement liner because it was a single-use
component, it distinguished other cases involving multi-use components
such as a die set and a switch.
39
In other words, if a raw material or component is properly manufac-
tured, liability may be imposed only when the alleged danger that caused
the injury extends across all end-uses of the component or raw material
- either because the component or raw material has only one end-use,
like the swimming pool liner in Fleck,4" or because it is toxic or
31id. at 118.
37 id.
3s Id.
39 Id. See Jacobini v. V. & 0. Press Co., 588 A.2d 476, 479-80 (Pa. 1991) (holding
that a directed verdict should have been entered for the supplier of a component that
"itself is not dangerous, and where the danger arises from the manner in which the
component is utilized by the assembler of the final product"); Wenrick v. Schloemann-
Siemag Aktiengesellschaft, 564 A.2d 1244, 1247-48 (Pa. 1989) (affir-ming a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict for the supplier of a switch that was dangerous as used in
another company's electrical control system).
40 See also Estate of Carey v. Hy-Temp Mfg. Co., 929 F.2d 1229, 1231 (7th Cir.
1991) (specialized switch used in an energy-saving device for a furnace); Donahue v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1000, 1009 (8th Cir. 1989) (ethyl mercaptan, used
specifically to odorize liquid propane gas, with inherent danger of odor fade); Koonce v.
Quaker Safety Prod. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 715 (5th Cir. 1986) (safety suit for
munitions worker); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1134 (1st Cir. 1978)
(specialized electroplating machine), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979); Pan-Alaska
Fisheries v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 1977)
(marine engine whose filters ruptured and cracked); d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co.,
552 F.2d 886, 893 (9th Cir. 1977) (specialized fiber sold expressly for carpeting); Braniff
Airways, Inc. v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 453 (2d Cir.) (airplane engine that
was prone to cylinder barrel separation), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969); Halter v.
Waco Scaffolding & Equip. Co., 797 P.2d 790, 795 (Colo. Ct. App.) (clips used to secure
visqueen in cold and windy weather, but had tendency to pop off in that weather), cert.
denied, 1990 Colo. LEXIS 651 (Sept. 24, 1990); Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Co.,
517 P.2d 406, 408 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (brake pedal assembly); Giordano v. Ford Motor
1995-96] 229
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otherwise dangerous for normal handling." If a component or raw
material has multiple uses and is not inherently dangerous, courts have
consistently held that the raw material or component supplier cannot be
held liable.42
Another, and perhaps clearer, way of stating the rule is to break it
down into a series of requirements.43 Courts will not impose liability on
a supplier of material - whether a raw material or a component - when
the following four conditions are met. First, the material is not designed
for use in a particular type of finished product or finished product system.
Second, the material is a standard item that is generally safe as a
"building block" for use in making a variety of finished products. Third,
the material was adapted by another entity to manufacture a finished
product. Fourth, any danger arises from the specialized end-use of the
Co., 299 S.E.2d 897, 899-90 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (carburetor with inherent dangers when
primed); Thomas v. Kaiser Agric. Chem., 407 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ill. 1980) (adaptor intended
for fertilizer applicator); Smith v. Air Feeds, Inc., 519 N.W.2d 827, 831 (Iowa Ct. App.
1994) (feeder that was intended to be mated with a press); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.,
297 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Minn.) (cotton flannelette used for children's sleepwear), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980); Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179,
185-86 (N.J. 1982) (specialized press); Dougherty v. Edward J. Meloney, Inc., 661 A.2d
375, 378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (shut-off valve used specifically with boilers, where it had
an inherent danger); Zacher v. Budd Co., 396 N.W.2d 122, 135-40 (S.D. 1986) (multi-
piece rim with inherent danger of mismatch); Rego Co. v. Brannon, 682 S.W.2d 677, 680
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (safety valve used for tanks of flammable gas; "dangers inherent"
included that valve would release flammable gas as pressure built up); Parkins v. Van
Doren Sales, Inc., 724 P.2d 389, 392 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (conveyor parts that
allegedly could be used only one way).
41 In the following cases, the component or raw material had more than one end-use,
but the same inherent danger accompanied all end-uses. See Whitehead v. Saint Joe Lead
Co., 729 F.2d 238, 242 (3d Cir. 1984) (lead ingots); Bryant v. Technical Research Co.,
654 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1981) (methyl butyl ketone, which causes degenerative
nerve disease on contact); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 739 F. Supp. 328, 331 (E.D.
Tex. 1990) (raw asbestos); Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 359 (D. Kan.
1983) (aircraft instruments containing "deadly radium"); Ray v. Upjohn Co., 851 S.W.2d
646, 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (isocyanate); Macrie v. SDS Biotech Corp., 630 A.2d 805,
809-10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (ultra-hazardous fungicide), cert. denied and appeal
dismissed,636 A.2d 522 (N.J. 1993); Nor-Am Agric. Prod., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 537
P.2d 682, 688 (N.M. Ct. App.) (highly toxic mercury-based fungicide), cert. denied, 536
P.2d 1085 (N.M. 1975); see also Beauchamp v. Russell, 547 F. Supp. 1191, 1197-98
(N.D. Ga. 1982) (involving an air valve that had "innumerable potential uses," but the
need to bleed compressed air is "applicable to all potential users of the valve"); Union
Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d 276, 281-84 (Colo. 1978) (involving a conveyor with a nip
point that had an inherent danger).
42 See, e.g., supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
4 The author is indebted to Ross Schmucki for this conceptualization.
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material, not the normal handling and use of the material before it is
incorporated into the particular type of finished product.
Most raw materials meet these four conditions. A raw material by
definition is of value to society precisely because it can be adapted to a wide
variety of applications. Wood, steel, gravel, stone, and cotton are valuable
because of their many applications, not because they have only one use. That
does not mean that they are "safe' in all applications; no material is. But only
when the raw material is dangerous in normal handling and use, such as
radium, methyl butyl ketone, or raw asbestos fibers," will the raw material
supplier typically be unable to satisfy these four conditions.
A component will less frequently meet these four conditions because
many components are tailored to specific end products. For example, a
swimming pool liner is not a "building block," but rather a specialized
component intended for a specific use. Nonetheless, one can conceive of
many components, such as the valve and chain in Crossfield and Childress,
that satisfy all four conditions.
C. Applications of the Limit on Liability
Applying this rule, courts have exonerated as a matter of law suppliers
of such multi-purpose components and raw materials as steel rods,45
switches,46 standardized motors, 47 drilling rig parts," conveyor parts,4
9
pulleys," tower legs,5 chassis,52 lenses,53 roofing compounds,5 4 lum-
ber,55 Kevlar@ fibers,56 and raw ore.57 These opinions typically have
44 See cases cited supra note 41.
45 McWaters v. Steel Serv. Co., 597 F.2d 79, 80 (6th Cir. 1979).46 Dahlbeck v. DICO Co., 355 N.W.2d 157, 163 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Wenrick v.
Schloemann-Siemag Aktiengesellschaft, 564 A.2d 1244, 1247-48 (Pa. 1989).
41 Willis v. National Equip. Design Co., 868 F. Supp. 725, 732-33 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aft'd,
66F.3d314 (3d Cir. 1995); Leev. ButcherBoy, 215 Cal. Rptr. 195, 198-202 (Ct. App. 1985).
48 Davis v. Dresser Indus., 800 S.W.2d 369, 370-71 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Noonan
v. Texaco, 713 P.2d 160, 164 (Wyo. 1986).
41 Willis, 868 F. Supp. at 728-32; Searls v. Doe, 505 N.E.2d 287, 289-90 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1986); Moor v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 320 N.W.2d 927, 928 (S.D. 1982).
" Haupt v. Atwood Oceanics, Inc., 681 F.2d 1058, 1060 (5th Cir. 1982).
51 Loos v. American Energy Savers, Inc., 522 N.E.2d 841, 845 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
52 Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 1978); Shaw v. General
Motors Corp., 727 P.2d 387, 389-90 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
5' Hall v. Scott U.S.A., Ltd., 400 S.E.2d 700, 703-04 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990), cert.
denied, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 451 (Jan. 31, 1991).
4 Standhardt v. Flintkote Co., 508 P.2d 1283, 1289-90 (N.M. 1973).
5 Parker v. Warren, 503 S.W.2d 938, 945 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).
56 House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 553-54 (Utah App. 1994).
17 Cothrun v. Schwartz, 752 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (raw asbestos
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emphasized the many possible end-uses of the component or raw
material. 8 It is difficult, in fact, to find any reported cases where a
ore). See also Sperry v. Bauermeister, Inc., 4 F.3d 596, 598-99 (8th Cir. 1993) (machine
components); Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir. 1973) (crane as a
component of a factory); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 845 F. Supp. 1122, 1126
(M.D.N.C. 1994) (component parts of a mobile food service vehicle); Sperry v.
Bauermeister, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1512, 1517-18 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (airlock); Wright v.
Federal Mach. Co.. 535 F. Supp. 645, 649-50 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (rollers); Cropper v. Rego
Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 1142, 1156 (D. Del. 1982) (valve); Mayberry v. Akron
Rubber Mach. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 407, 413 (N.D. Okla. 1979) (mill parts); Kellar v.
Inductotherm Corp., 498 F. Supp. 172, 175 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (furnace and deck), aff'd,
633 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980); Blackwell v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 706, 710
(Ct. App. 1984) (acid); Walker v. Stauffer Chem. Corp., 96 Cal. Rptr. 803, 806 (Ct. App.
1971) (acid); Shelton v. Wisconsin Motor Corp., 382 So. 2d 1270, 1271 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.) (engine), petition denied, 389 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 1980); Curry v. Louis Allis Co.,
427 N.E.2d 254, 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (motor); Shanks v. A.F.E. Indus., Inc., 416
N.E.2d 833, 837-38 (Ind. 1981) (grain dryer); Champion v. Panel Era Mfg. Co., 410 So.
2d 1230, 1241-42 (La. Ct. App.) (fire-retardant paper), cert. denied, 414 So. 2d 389 (La.
1982); Mitchell v. Sky Climber, Inc., 487 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Mass. 1986) (lift motor);
Welsh v. Bowling Elec. Mach., Inc., 875 S.W.2d 569, 573-75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (tram
components); Erickson v. Monarch Indus., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 99, 109-10 (Neb. 1984)
(transformer); Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425, 431 (Ohio) (valve), clarified
and amended, 643 N.E.2d 138 (Ohio 1994); Kremerv. Duriron Co., 532 N.E.2d 165, 167
(Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (valve); Jacobini v. V. & 0. Press Co., 588 A.2d 476, 479-80
(Pa. 1991) (die set); Molina v. Kelco Tool & Die, Inc., 904 S.W.2d 857, 861-62 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1995) (die); Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 252 S.E.2d 358, 367
(Va. 1979) (lid); Shawver v. Roberts Corp., 280 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Wis. 1979)
(conveyor).
One treatise which appears to have recognized the controlling principles is M.
STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3.22, at 86 (2d ed. 1988):
Where the final assembled product to which the component part manufactur-
er has contributed is dangerously defective, the component manufactur-
er's liability does not necessarily follow. While the supplier of an other-
wise innocuous constituent part or element of a final product to be assembled by
another has been occasionally held to have a duty of due care, or even a duty
to warn, of foreseeable harmful uses, the component manufacturer more often
has been held to have no strict liability exposure where its part of nondefective
construction or formulation is later assembled by a third party into a final
product without due care, or without adequate warnings.
Id. (citations omitted).
" See, e.g., McWaters v. Steel Serv. Co., 597 F.2d 79, 80 (6th Cir. 1979)
(recognizing that the rods involved in the case were "basic constructionmaterials"); Willis
v. National Equip. Design Co., 868 F. Supp. 725, 732 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (recognizing that
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claim against a supplier of a properly manufactured multi-use component
or raw material that was not dangerous in normal handling was found to
present even a jury question. 9
the motor had "a wide variety ofapplications"), aff'd, 66 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 1995); Sperry,
786 F. Supp. at 1518 (recognizing that the airlock involved was "usable in a variety of
machinery"); Lee v. Butcher Boy, 215 Cal. Rptr. 195, 199 (Ct. App. 1985) (recogniz-
ing that the motors were "ordinary, off-the-shelf motors"); Shaw v. General Motors
Corp., 727 P.2d 387, 389 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) ("The record here shows that the GM
cab and chassis could be equipped for numerous different uses .... "); Curry, 427
N.E.2d at 255 ("a general purpose drive motor ... commonly used in hundreds of
varied applications"); Shanks, 416 N.E.2d at 838 (stating that "the dryer could be
incorporated into a variety of grain handling systems"); Dahlbeck v. DICO Co., 355
N.W.2d 157, 163 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (" '[A] purchaser of multi-use equipment knows
best the dangers associatedwith its particular use, and so it should determine the degree of
safety provided.'") (quoting Wagner v. International Harvester Co., 611 F.2d 224, 231
(8th Cir. 1979)).
" Some possible examples are Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chem. Co., 524 F.2d 19,
29 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that the grant of summary judgment in favor of a
firework component supplier was improper); States Steamship Co. v. Stone Manganese
Marine, Ltd., 371 F. Supp. 500, 505 (D.N.J. 1973) (denying summary judgment to the
supplier of a defective alloy used in ship propellers); Seegers Grain Co. v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 577 N.E.2d 1364, 1369 (Ill. App. Ct.) (affirming a jury verdict
against a steel plate manufacturer), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 140 (Ill. 1991); Oak
Grove Investors v. Bell & Gossett Co., 668 P.2d 1075, 1080 (Nev. 1983), appeal after
remand, 843 P.2d 351 (Nev. 1992) (recognizing that a supplier of pipe fittings owed
a duty to warn about the inappropriateness of fittings for an open-loop system).
Yet, apart from Suchomajcz, which involved very exceptional facts, i.e., the
component supplier allegedly knew or had reason to know of illegal conduct on the
part of the manufacturer, Suchomajcz, 524 F.2d at 22, it is not even clear that these
cases are exceptions. The court in States Steamship recognized that the alloy was
"defective" without explaining why; it may have been inherently defective for all
possible end-uses or may have been designed specifically for ship propellers. States
Steamship Co., 371 F. Supp. at 502. The steel plate in Seegers Grain appears to have been
inherently defective because it could not be used in cold temperatures. Seegers,
577 N.E.2d at 1368. The pipe fittings in the Oak Grove case may have been
specialized equipment that had a very limited number of end-uses. Oak Grove, 668 P.2d
at 1077.
Another arguably close case is Cross v. Cummins Engine Co., 993 F.2d 112(5th Cir.
1993). There, the defendant furnished a diesel engine without an air intake shutoff
valve to prevent "overspeeding," a situation which results when combustible fumes from
the outside environment enter the engine. While such a valve is not necessary for all
diesel engines, the defendant did sell it separately. Id. at 114. The court vacated
summary judgment for the defendant because it had not presented adequate evidence on
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Furthermore, this principle applies whether the claim against the
supplier is for improper design or for failure to warn. In pursuing design
defect claims against multi-use component suppliers, plaintiffs typically
argue that the component lacked a "safety device" needed for its use in
the specific finished product.6" In failure to warn claims, plaintiffs often
argue that the defendant should have warned that its component or raw
material would be dangerous as used in the finished product. 6' In many
whether trade customs, relative expertise, and practicality supported the design and
warning claims against the engine supplier. Id. at 116. The court's decision appears
to have been of a procedural nature based merely on the fact that the record was not
sufficiently developed.
In the recent multidistrict litigation rulings granting summary judgment to
suppliers of raw materials used in temporomandibular joint ("TMJ") implants and breast
implants respectively, see infra notes 73-78, the courts pointed out that Suchomajcz
was the only case cited by the plaintiffs where a supplier of a multi-purpose, not-
inherently dangerous raw material did not obtain judgment as a matter of law. In re
Silicone Gel Breast Implants, 887 F. Supp. 1463, 1467 (N.D. Ala. 1995); In re TMJ
Implants, 872 F. Supp. 1019, 1028 (D. Minn. 1995). While this Article argues that
"foreseeability" of the hazards of the finished product is irrelevant to the
liability of multi-use component and raw material suppliers, Suchomajcz suggests
otherwise when the extreme circumstance of actual knowledge of an illegal use is
present. Other courts have implied the same thing. See, e.g., Veil v. Vitek, Inc.,
803 F. Supp. 229, 232-33 (D.N.D. 1992) (suggesting that a raw material supplier
could be held liable if it concealed independent conclusive knowledge of the
inappropriateness of its raw material for use in another company's finished
product). Under such circumstances, other tort doctrines, such as intentional torts,
would be available to the plaintiff. For product liability purposes, it is clear that
"foreseeability" as traditionally used in the product liability field is insufficient
to impose liability on a supplier of a multi-purpose raw material or component that is
not dangerous in general handling and use.
60 See, e.g., Kellar v. Inductotherm Corp., 498 F. Supp. 172, 175 (E.D. Tenn.
1978) (involving a claim that a furnace/deck should have been designed to protect
foundry workers from the danger of the pit at all times), aff'd, 633 F.2d 216 (6th Cir.
1980).
" See, e.g., Crossfield v. Quality Control Equip. Co., 1 F.3d 701, 703 (8th Cir.
1993) (claiming that defendant should have warned that its chain was dangerous as used
in the chitterling cleaning machine); McWaters v. Steel Serv. Co., 597 F.2d 79, 80
(6th Cir. 1979) (claiming that defendant should have warned of the dangers of using
construction rods without guy wires); Dahlbeck v. DICO Co., 355 N.W.2d 157, 163
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (claiming that a switch manufacturer should have warned of the
hazards of using this kind of switch); Searls v. Doe, 505 N.E.2d 287, 289-90 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1986) (alleging that suppliers of conveyor components should have warned of
a dangerous conveyor system).
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instances, plaintiffs raise both arguments. 62 Regardless, both claims have
been consistently rejected by the courts. 3
It is important to understand the distinction between these multi-use
component/raw material principles and the "contract specifications"
defense. The contract specifications defense applies to specialized, single-
use components, and holds that the component supplier is not liable for
negligent design if the component conforms to specifications unless the
specifications are obviously dangerous.' The principles discussed in this
Article apply to both design and warning claims, and have no exception
based on the alleged foreseeability of the risk in the finished product.
The TMJ cases that were filed against E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Company represent a recent application of these principles.65 Between
1983 and 1988 a medical device manufacturer named Vitek, Inc. sold
thousands of implants for the temporomandibular joint ("TMJ") or "jaw
joint." Vitek's TMJ implants were fabricated in part from inert Teflon®
fluoropolymers made by DuPont.66 DuPont, however, had no role in the
62 See, e.g., Wright v. Federal Mach. Co., 535 F. Supp. 645, 649 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(claiming that defendant did not provide a guard or warn about the risk of not having a
guard); Mayberry v. Akron Rubber Mach. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 407, 412-14 (N.D. Okla.
1979) (involving a claim that mill parts lacked adequate safety devices and that defendant
should have warned about their dangers when used in a rubber mixing mill); Lee, 215 Cal.
Rptr. at 198-202 (involving a claim that the motor should have had a brake or clutch and
that defendant should have warned about hazards); Shaw, 727 P.2d at 389 (involving a
claim that defendant should either have installed a backup buzzer or warned about the
need for one); Loos v. American Energy Savers, Inc., 522 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988) (involving a claim that tower legs were of inadequate strength and that defendant
should have warned of the inadequacy); Shanks v. A.F.E. Indus., Inc., 416 N.E.2d 833,
837-38 (Ind. 1981) (involving a claim that defendant should have warned or equipped
warning devices); Davis v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 800 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990) (involving a claim that drilling rig parts should have been designed so that they
could not be used without a guard or that defendants should have warned about the need
for such a guard).
63 See, e.g., Crossfield, 1 F.3d at 703-06 (ruling as a matter of law that component
manufacturer was not liable); Kellar,498 F. Supp. at 175-76 (granting defendant's motion
notwithstanding the verdict).
"See. e.g., Estate of Carey, 929 F.2d 1229, 1234-35 (7th Cir. 1990) (reversing
directed verdict because specifications were obviously dangerous); Collins v. Newman
Mach. Co., 380 S.E.2d 314,317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (ruling that a contract specifications
defense is inapplicable where defendant should have realized that its specialized
components were dangerously unsafe when incorporated into the finished product).
6 As previously noted, the author of this Article has been one of the attorneys
representing DuPont in these cases since 1992.
66 Other ingredients used by Vitek in the fabrication of the implants included salt and
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design, manufacture or sale of these implants apart from selling raw
materials to Vitek. Although initial clinical experience with the implants
was positive, it has been reported more recently that the implants
fragment over time and cause injury. Lawsuits have been filed against
Vitek, which petitioned for bankruptcy in 1990.67 Plaintiffs have also
sought to pursue DuPont on the theory that DuPont allegedly "knew or
should have known" its Teflon® fluoropolymer raw materials were
unsuitable for use in the TMJ.
In case after case, DuPont has been granted summary judgment
against the plaintiff's claims under this theory.68 In addition, DuPont has
prevailed in every appeal to date.69 Both failure to warn and design
aluminum oxide. Vitek combined Teflon® fluoropolymers, aluminum oxide, and salt in
a patented process to make "Proplast®," a Vitek-patented material, to which Vitek then
laminated fluoropolymers. Vitek sold the implant as a prescription-only device to replace
the natural cartilaginous "meniscus," or disc, in the TMJ when it was damaged or
displaced. SeeKlem v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 19 F.3d 997, 999-1000 (5th Cir.
1994); Hoyt v. Vitek, Inc., 894 P.2d 1225, 1228 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Westphal v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 531 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 537
N.W.2d 571 (Wis. 1995).
67 Hegna v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 825 F. Supp. 880, 882 n.1 (D. Minn.
1993), aff'd, 27 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1994).
68 See, e.g., In re TMJ Implants, 872 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Minn. 1995); Kalinowski v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 851 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Kealoha v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 844 F. Supp. 590 (D. Haw. 1994); LaMontagne v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 834 F. Supp. 576 (D. Conn. 1993), affd, 41 F.3d 846 (2d Cir. 1994);
Nowak v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 827 F. Supp. 1334 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Hegna
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 825 F. Supp. 880 (D. Minn. 1993), aff'd, 27 F.3d 571
(8th Cir. 1994); Forest v. Vitek, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 378 (D. Nev. 1993), aff'd sub nom.
Coulter v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 46 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 1995): Miller v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 811 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Tenn. 1992); Anguiano v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 808 F. Supp. 719 (D. Ariz. 1992), aff'd, 44 F.3d 806 (9th Cir.
1995); Veil v. Vitek, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 229 (D.N.D. 1992).
6 9 See, e.g., Jacobs v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Nos. 93-4144/93-5978/93-
6561, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 29436 (6th Cir. Oct. 19, 1995); Anguiano v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 44 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1995); LaMontagne v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 41 F.3d 846 (2d Cir. 1994); Apperson v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 41 F.3d
1103 (7th Cir. 1994); Klem v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 19 F.3d 997 (5th Cir.
1994); Rynders v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 21 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 1994); Bond
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 868 P.2d 1114 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied,
1994 Colo. Lexis 203 (Colo. Feb. 28, 1994); Longo v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
632 So. 2d 1193 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 637 So. 2d 464 (La. 1994); Hoyt v. Vitek,
Inc., 894 P.2d 1225 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Westphal v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
531 N.W.2d 386 (Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 537 N.W.2d 571 (Wis. 1995).70 jacobs, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 29436, at *52-60; Klem, 19 F.3d at 1001-03;
Kalinowski, 851 F. Supp. at 156-57; Kealoha, 844 F. Supp. at 595; Bond, 868 P.2d at
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defect" claims against DuPont have been rejected. While DuPont has
prevailed on several independent legal grounds, courts have often
followed the rule set forth in this Article: a supplier of a component or
ingredient, which has multiple uses and is not inherently dangerous,
cannot be liable for another company's finished product.72 Indeed, after
the remaining federal cases against DuPont from approximately twenty-
eight different states were consolidated in a single judicial district,73 the
transferee court granted summary judgment in every case, holding that
"the great weight of authority" compelled this result and that the
principles discussed in this Article would be "followed in every jurisdic-
tion."74 The court used the phrase "raw material supplier defense" to
describe these principles, while acknowledging that they apply equally to
certain kinds of components as well.75
Even more recently, the court presiding over the multidistrict breast
implant litigation granted summary judgment to Scotfoam Corporation,
a bulk supplier of multi-purpose polyurethane foam used in breast
implants.76 Emphasizing the many applications of the foam, and that the
foam is not inherently dangerous, the court exonerated Scotfoam despite
1120; Longo, 632 So. 2d at 1197; Hoyt, 894 P.2d at 1230.
71 Jacobs, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 29436, at *70-75; Apperson, 41 F.3d at 1107;
Klein, 19 F.3d at 1003; Bond, 868 P.2d at 1119; Longo, 632 So. 2d at 1197; Hoyt, 894
P.2d at 1230.
712 See, e.g., Apperson, 41 F.3d at 1106 ("Teflon[®] is [a product] with many safe
uses; it only became dangerous when Vitek incorporated it into a highly specialized
medical device .... "); Klem, 19 F.3d at 1002 (stating that "the Louisiana courts have
never held that the manufacturer of a component part of a finished product has a duty to
the ultimate consumer to test the suitability of the component for its use in the
finished product"); Rynders, 21 F.3d at 842 ("It would be unreasonable and impractical
to place the burden of testing and developing all devices that incorporate Teflon[®] as a
component on DuPont."); In re TMJImplants, 872 F. Supp. at 1028 (holding that DuPont
was entitled to summary judgment because it supplied "multi-use materials that were not
inherently dangerous"); Kalinowski, 851 F. Supp. at 158 (recognizing DuPont as "a
supplier of a multi-use raw material"); Nowak, 827 F. Supp. at 1336-37 (recognizing
that Teflon® has a "variety of safe uses"); Veil, 803 F. Supp. at 235 ("There is no
showing that Teflon[®] is inherently defective or dangerous. The alleged danger
associated with [T]eflon[®] here is its use in the manufacture of a prosthesis im-
plant."); Bond, 868 P.2d at 1119 ("[P]laintiffs do not contest that Teflon[®] is safe for
multiple uses."); Hoyt, 894 P.2d at 1231 ("It is indisputable that Teflon[®] is safe for a
wide variety of uses.").
11 In re TMJ Implants, 844 F. Supp. 1553 (J.P.M.L. 1994).
4 In re TMJImplants, 872 F. Supp. at 1028.751 d. at 1025 (citing Crossfield v. Quality Control Equip. Co., I F.3d 701 (8th Cir.
1993) and Childress v. Gresen Mfg. Co., 888 F.2d 45 (6th Cir. 1989)).
76 In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants, 887 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
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allegations that the foam caused injury and that Scotfoam knew of the
hazards." The court cited Crossfield, Fleck, and five of the DuPont TMJ
decisions in holding that Scotfoam could not be liable under the law of
any of the thirty-nine jurisdictions where it had been sued.7"
To give one more illustration, it is worth comparing two categories
of motor vehicle component cases - tire rim cases and chassis cases.
With tires and tire rims, which always present the danger of explosion
from a mismatch of tires or rim parts, courts have usually held that the
component supplier can be liable for failing to warn about that inherent
danger.79 On the other hand, courts have generally rejected claims that
suppliers of multi-purpose vehicle chassis should have warned about risks
arising from specialized end-uses of those chassis, even when plaintiffs
have argued that those uses and the accompanying risks were foresee-
able.80
77Id. at 1466-69.
781Id. at 1467.
79 See, e.g., Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 F.2d 851, 857-60 (8th Cir.)
(recognizing that the supplier of a multi-piece rim had a duty to warn of the danger of
mismatch), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Zacher v. Budd Co., 396 N.W.2d 122, 135-
40 (S.D. 1986) (recognizing that the supplier of a multi-piece rim had a duty to warn of
the danger of mismatch); Iloskyv. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603, 609-10 (W. Va.
1983) (ruling that a radial tire supplier had a duty to warn about the dangers of mismatch
with conventional tires).
1o See, e.g., Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 1978) ("Since Ford
manufactures the F-700 for a variety of uses and Leach's conversion business is solely
concerned with garbage trucks, it seems much more practical for Leach to install the
warning device."); Watts v. TI, Inc., 561 So. 2d 1057, 1058-59 (Ala. 1990) (rejecting
product liability claims against supplier of cab and chassis); Fierro v. International
Harvester Co., 179 Cal. Rptr. 923, 925-26 (Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting warning and design
defect claims against supplier of skeleton vehicle); Shaw v. General Motors Corp., 727
P.2d 387,390 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) ("The burden of guarding against the injury suffered
here should appropriately be placed upon the entity that designed the final product,
arranged for acquisition of all the component parts, and directed their assembly.");
Ruegger v. International Harvester Co., 576 N.E.2d 288, 290-91 (II. App. Ct. 1991)
("The vehicle at issue was a standard cab-chassis used for many different purposes
... ."); Paul v. Ford Motor Co., 607 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (App. Div.) (affirming summary
judgment for the manufacturer and distributor of a chassis-cab), appeal denied, 639
N.E.2d 415 (N.Y. 1994); Elliott v. Century Chevrolet, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1980) (affirming trial court's grant of summary judgment because the supplier
was "not in the business of selling a truck chassis for any specific use"); cf. Uloth v. City
Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1194 (Mass. 1978) (recognizing that a supplier of an upper
component - garbage truck refuse body - can be held liable); Fernandez v. Ford Motor
Co., 879 P.2d 101, 111-12 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that manufacturers of tractor
and trailer could be liable where both were registered vehicles and device could be
installed for all uses). But see Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 390 S.E.2d 61, 68
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To sum up: if the alleged "danger" or "defect" in a component or
raw material is simply its unsuitability for another company's finished
product, the responsibility for that "danger" or "defect" must rest with
the finished product manufacturer. That is true even if the risk in the
finished product is foreseeable to the component or raw material
supplier.8 The relevant question is not whether the component or raw
material is inert or innocuous by itself, as are many specialized compo-
nents such as the swimming pool liner in Fleck.82 It is whether the
danger arises from a specific end-use of the component or raw material
or from a danger that extends across all end-uses.
While few courts have expressly adopted a standard that distinguishes
between inherent dangers and end-use-specific dangers, some courts come
close to adopting this approach. For example, some courts have focused
on whether the danger in the finished product resulted from a "dangerous
propensity" in the component. 3 Others have considered whether liability
should be placed on the component supplier or the finished product
manufacturer based upon trade custom, relative expertise, and practicali-
ty." Still others have asked whether the defect was in the design of the
(Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that summary judgment should not be granted to chassis
supplier), cert. denied, 1990 Ga. Lexis 667 (Ga. Mar. 13, 1990).
81 In addition to Childress and Crossfield, see the following cases: Kealoha v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 844 F. Supp. 590, 594 (D. Haw. 1994) (foreseeability
irrelevant); Kellar v. Inductotherm Corp., 498 F. Supp. 172, 175 (E.D. Tenn. 1978)
("Plaintiffs argue that defendant should be held liable here because it could foresee the
danger of the unguarded pit and could have eliminated the danger.... If a manufacturer
could be held liable for injury merely because it foresaw a danger created by another
party, there would literally be no end of potential liability. To sustain such a theory would
be to cast manufacturers into the role of insurers of products manufactured by others."),
aff'd, 633 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980); Standhardt v. Flintkote Co., 508 P.2d 1283, 1289
(N.M. 1973) (finding that defendant had knowledge of the unsuitable end-use); Searls v.
Doe, 505 N.E.2d 287, 289-90 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (affirming summary judgment for
component suppliers; expert affidavit that they should have foreseen danger in the finished
product failed to create a genuine issue of fact); Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag
Aktiengesellschaft, 564 A.2d 1244, 1248 (Pa. 1989) ("mere knowledge of a dangerous
situation" did not impose upon the component supplier a duty to act); Davis v. Dresser
Indus., Inc., 800 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting the foregoing language
from Wenrick).
82 Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, 981 F.2d 107, 119 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1645 (1993).
83 Komanekin v. Inland Truck Parts, 819 F. Supp. 802, 809-11 (E.D. Wis. 1993)
(involving a suit against the manufacturer of drive shaft component parts).
84 This test originated with Judge I-igginbotham's opinion in Verge, 581 F.2d at 386-
88, and has been followed in other decisions. See, e.g., Cross v. Cummins Engine Co.,
993 F.2d 112, 115 (5th Cir. 1993); Powell v. E.W. Bliss Co., 529 F. Supp. 48, 51 (E.D.
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component or in the design of the finished product." Yet another
approach, discussed further below, is to ask whether the component
supplier "created" the risk. 6
Usually, these standards should lead to the same result as the "multi-
use component or raw material" approach; however, they are more vague
and therefore more difficult to apply. For example, to borrow the
Childress facts, if a valve has many applications and is dangerous only
when another company uses it in a log-splitter, then it is difficult to argue
that the valve supplier "created" the risk; rather, it appears that the
manufacturer of the log-splitter did. However, murky concepts like
"creating a risk" are an invitation to endless debate. A standard that
divides components and raw materials into those which have multiple safe
end-uses and those which have a danger accompanying all end-uses is
easiest to apply and best explains the existing limits on component and
raw material supplier liability.
I. REASONS BEHIND THE LIMIT
ON WARNING AND DESIGN CLAIMS
A. Reasons Given in the Past
Courts have generally given two policy reasons for why multi-use
component and raw material suppliers should not have to assure the
safety of their materials as used in other companies' finished products.
First, as stated by the Childress court, that would require suppliers to
"retain an expert in the client's field of business to determine whether the
client intends to develop a safe product., 87 Simply put, it is one thing
Pa. 1981), aff'dwithoutopinion, 681 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982); Mayberryv. Akron Rubber
Mach. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 407, 412 (N.D. Okla. 1979); Mott v. Callahan AMS Mach.
Co., 416 A.2d 57, 60-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980).
8 Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 583 P.2d 276, 282 (Colo. 1978).
86 DeLeon v. Commercial Mfg. & Supply Co., 195 Cal. Rptr. 867, 871-75 (Ct. App.
1983) (holding that summary judgment should not have been granted to the supplier of
a custom-made bin that was specially designed for a factory because the bin arguably
created the risk of harm).
87 Childress v. Gresen Mfg. Co., 888 F.2d 45,49 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting the district
court opinion at 690 F. Supp. 587, 592 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1988)). Other courts have
expressedthe same view. See, e.g., Crossfieldv. Quality Control Equip. Co., I F.3d 701,
704 (8th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that "suppliers would be required to hire machine design
experts to scrutinize machine systems that the supplier had no role in developing"); In re
TMJ Implants, 872 F. Supp. 1019, 1025 (D. Minn. 1995) (recognizing that imposing
liability on the raw material supplier would require it to retain experts in "a huge variety
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to require a supplier of a single-use or inherently dangerous component
or raw material to warn about a danger that accompanies all end-uses; it
would be quite another to require the supplier of a versatile, multi-use
component or raw material to monitor the safety of innumerable end-
products and issue end-use-specific warnings. Where the risk is specific
to the finished product, rather than general to the component or raw
material, common sense dictates that the finished product manufacturer
- not the supplier - should bear it. Valve suppliers should not have to
become experts on log-splitters, and sellers of fluoropolymer raw
materials should not have to become experts on TMJ implants.
Courts have also made a related, even more intuitive point: finished
product manufacturers know exactly what they intend to do with a
component or raw material and therefore are in a better position to
guarantee that the component or raw material is suitable for their
particular applications."8
Significantly, neither of these related arguments requires that the risk
in the finished product be unforeseeable to the supplier. Even if the
supplier could anticipate a potential danger in the other company's end
product, it would not necessarily be in a reasonable position to take
of areas in order to determine the possible risks associated with each potential use");
Kealoha v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 844 F. Supp. 590, 594 (D. Haw. 1994)
("[I]mposing such a duty would force the supplier to retain an expert in every finished
product manufacturer's line ofbusiness and second-guessthe fmishedproduct manufactur-
er whenever any of its employees received any information about any potential
problems."); Wright v. Federal Mach. Co., 535 F. Supp. 645, 650 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(recognizing that "the law does not impose a duty on the seller of replacement parts to
undertake an independent safety investigation of their intended use"); Searls v. Doe, 505
N.E.2d 287, 289 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing that the defendants were not required
to procure plans of the entire system, review those plans, and independently determine
whether their respective component parts would function in a safe fashion); see also Orion
Ins. Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 502 F. Supp. 173, 178 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (making
the same point in a case involving specialized parts).
8 Apperson v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 41 F.3d 1103, 1107 (7th Cir. 1994)
("The manufacturer of a finished product knows the precise use it intends to make of the
raw material or component part, and is in a far better position than the manufacturer of
raw materials to determine whether it is safe for that purpose."); Kealoha, 844 F. Supp.
at 594-95 (recognizing that "the fmishedproduct manufacturer knows the specific end-use
it intends to make of the material or component part and is in a far better position to
evaluate its safety for that particular end use"); Lockett v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp.
1201, 1212 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd without opinion, 511 F.2d 1393, 1394 (3d Cir. 1975)
(stating that a final assembler of the gears had more reason to know of the dangers
presented by operation of the gears in the finished product); Lee v. Butcher Boy, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 195, 202 (Ct. App. 1985); Shaw v. General Motors Corp., 727 P.2d 387, 390-91
(Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
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preventive action. The supplier would still have to examine the other
company's studies, testing, and manufacturing methods to determine
whether the risk actually exists, whether there are countervailing
benefits, and whether the finished product manufacturer has taken
appropriate measures regarding the risk. In short, the supplier would
still have to become an expert in the other company's line of business.89
Hence, even when the risk is "foreseeable," the multi-use component or
raw material supplier would face major obstacles in protecting against it
through appropriate warnings or design modifications. And, in fact, as
this Article has already noted, the law does not require the supplier to
do so.
Both related arguments, however, appear to assume a critical point -
that the finished product manufacturer has more knowledge than the
component/raw material supplier about the safety of the component or
raw material as used in its finished product. Although that should usually
be the case, probably was the case in Childress,9" and undoubtedly was
the case in the TMJ litigation,9" one can conceive of situations where
that might not be true. In Crossfield, for example, the chain supplier also
manufactured chitterling cleaning machines and thus possessed consider-
able knowledge about their dangers.9" If the plaintiff could demonstrate
that the component or raw material supplier already had greater knowl-
edge about the risks of the component or raw material as used in the
finished product, then arguably the two premises of these arguments (that
the supplier is being required to become an "expert" in another compa-
ny's business and that the finished product manufacturer is in the "best
position" to evaluate and eliminate risk) would fail.
This leads to another possibility: the component/raw material supplier
should be required to tell the finished pioduct manufacturer everything
it knows about the manufacturer's intended end-use of its raw material or
component, but nothing more. Such a requirement would insure that the
finished product manufacturer has knowledge at least equal to the
supplier. Finished product manufacturers have to give end-use-specific
warnings; why not raw material and component suppliers as well? For
instance, should the chain supplier in Crossfield have been required to tell
8' See, e.g., Kealoha, 844 F. Supp. at 594.
90 Childress, 888 F.2d at 49.
9' Apperson v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 41 F.3d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1994);
In re TMJImplants, 872 F. Supp. at 1025; Hegna v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 825
F. Supp. 880, 884 (D. Minn. 1993), aff'd sub nom. Abrams v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 27 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1994).
92 Crossfield v. Quality Control Equip. Co., 1 F.3d 701, 703 (8th Cir. 1993).
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the machine manufacturer what the supplier knew about the dangers of
unguarded chains from its experience building chitterling cleaning
machines itself?93
In fact, courts require some raw material and component suppliers to
give warnings to finished product manufacturers. This is the bulk
supplier/sophisticated purchaser rule, which exempts bulk suppliers from
warning remote users so long as a responsible intermediary has been
apprised of the danger.94 The rule has been applied not only to bulk-
supplied finished products, but also to inherently dangerous raw materials
such as glycol ether acetates, dimethylformamide, and naphtha ingredi-
ents.95 These cases require the raw ingredient or component supplier to
warn its immediate customer; but if it does so, it is absolved from
liability.9
6
B. A Better Reason: Information Costs
Yet courts have not required multi-use component or raw material
suppliers to provide such warnings, nor should they. A better explanation
for the results that have emerged in the case law focuses on information
costs. The supplier of a multi-use raw material or component actually has
"' Presumably, this warning would also shield the supplier from design defect claims,
since the finished product manufacturer's design decisions would be fully informed.
" SeegenerallySmith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding
that bulk suppliers of silica sand to a knowledgeable purchaser owed no duty to warn the
end-user); Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Va. 1984), aff'd sub
nom. Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that bulk suppliers of silica
sand to a knowledgeable purchaser owed no duty to warn the end-user); Jones v. Hittle
Serv., Inc., 549 P.2d 1383 (Kan. 1976) (holding that bulk suppliers of liquid propane gas
to a knowledgeable purchaser owed no duty to warn end-users); Carole A. Cheney, Not
JustforDoctors: ApplyingtheLearnedlntermediaryDoctrineto the RelationshipBetween
ChemicalManufacturers, Industrial Employers, and Employees, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 562
(1991); Kenneth M. Willner, Note, Failures to Warn and the SophisticatedUserDefense,
74 VA. L. REv. 579 (1988).
11 See, e.g., Higgins v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 671 F. Supp. 1055, 1061 (D.
Md. 1987); Rivers v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 554 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403-05 (Sup. Ct.
1990); Whitehead v. Dycho Co., 775 S.W.2d 593, 598-600 (Tenn. 1989); see also Sara
Lee Corp. v. Homasote Co., 719 F. Supp. 417, 424 (D. Md. 1989) (flammable beads);
Hill v. Wilmington Chem. Corp., 156 N.W.2d 898, 902, 904 (Minn. 1968) (flammable
solvent).
96 The touchstone of this rule is whether the finished product manufacturer was
knowledgeable about the alleged risk, either because of a warning from its vendor or from
its own independent knowledge (in which case a warning would be superfluous). See Sara
Lee Corp., 719 F. Supp. at 424; Higgins, 671 F. Supp. at 1062; Hill, 156 N.W.2d at 902,
904; Rivers, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 405; Whitehead, 775 S.W.2d at 598.
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two potential "products" - the material or component itself and informa-
tion about that material or component. It has been theorized that product
liability law would be unnecessary if information markets worked well.97
Consumers would buy the amount of safety information they need to
attain the level of safety they desire.9" However, information markets do
not work well. They are beset by free-rider problems and other difficul-
ties in valuing and charging for information.99 Hence, according to this
theory, without product liability law, there would be a chronic shortage
of consumer safety information. Therefore, legislatures and courts require
"forced" or "tied" sales of products and information. To sell a product,
one must also sell information about the product - i.e., warnings. The
customer, in other words, is required to buy both the product and the
warnings. Product liability law enforces this coupling of product and
information sales.
All this makes sense in the context of a finished product manufacturer
and a finished product user. But the tables are turned when one is selling
a component or raw material to a finished product manufacturer. Where
the component or raw material has multiple end-uses and no inherent
danger, it may be very expensive for its supplier to gather and dissemi-
nate accurate information about potential end-use-specific risks. Stated
otherwise, the "information" may be costly relative to the "product"
itself. Requiring the supplier to provide both may eliminate the market
for the product, because customers (i.e., finished product manufacturers)
are not willing to pay for both. At the same time, the imperfections in the
information market that justified "tying" the two products together in the
consumer context do not exist.
For example, suppose one sells a multi-purpose valve, as in the
Childress case. The "product" itself, being a mass-produced commodity,
is inexpensive to make. But for the very same reason, comprehensive and
accurate "information" about it is costly to gather, because the valve has
many end-uses. Requiring the valve supplier to keep abreast of all end-
use risks and dangers of using the valve as a condition of selling it would
greatly increase the cost of the valve, perhaps to a prohibitive level.
Furthermore, while it is difficult for consumers to buy information
separately, it is far easier for finished product manufacturers like log-
97 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 136 (2d ed. 1977).98 id.
9' See James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 298 (1990)
("Markets rarely exist in which risk information and the effects of such information on
behavior are routinely priced.").
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splitter assemblers to do so. Finished product manufacturers can target the
specific information they need, for example, by hiring experts or
commissioning studies, knowing the costs of acquiring that information
can be recouped over a number of sales. To put the matter another way:
commodity-type raw material and component suppliers have difficulty
selling products with information; consumers have trouble buying
information without also buying products; and only finished product
manufacturers can readily and economically bridge the gap.
In one of the most thoughtful forays into the subject of component
part supplier liability,"'0 one commentator has urged the adoption of a
"cheapest cost avoider" analysis that would impose liability on the
component supplier if it can more easily detect and correct the defect
than the finished product manufacturer. According to this line of analysis,
"cheapest cost avoider" has two facets - who can more cheaply detect
the defect, and who can more cheaply correct it?10' Assuming, as will
usually be the case, that the finished product manufacturer has lower
correction or control costs, attention then shifts to the relative "detection"
costs.' If the component supplier has lower detection costs, according
to this analysis, it may still avoid liability if it provides the finished
product manufacturer with a full warning of the detected dangers.
Elegant in the abstract, these concepts would be exceedingly difficult
to apply in practice. Although Cunningham contends otherwise, "cheapest
cost avoider" is an ambiguous, unfamiliar term; it is not a concept
regularly encountered by judges and juries. Moreover, the component
supplier would have to determine beforehand whether it is a "cheaper
cost avoider" than its finished product manufacturer-customer. 0 3 The
supplier could hardly do this without examining the risk or "cost" itself.
Of course, the supplier could avoid making such a determination by
simply providing a prophylactic "full" warning to its customer. One
suspects that most suppliers would choose this alternative. Thus, in
practical effect, this legal standard would resemble the bulk suppli-
er/sophisticated purchaser rule: the component supplier would have to
make full disclosure to its customer, the finished product manufacturer;
having done so it would have no liability to the end-user.
' Richard D. Cunningham, Comment, Apportionment Between Partmakers and
Assemblers in Strict Liability, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 544 (1982).
101 Id. at 549-59.
102 id.
103 Cunningham acknowledges as much, but says that this determination would only
have to be a "crude approximation." Id. at 556. But crude approximation or not, the
burden on the supplier would remain the same.
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But, as noted, the costs of full disclosure would be high. The supplier
would have to collect, evaluate, and disseminate information, running the
risk that its actions could be second-guessed by a factfinder. With the
benefit of hindsight, one can often find something - some anecdote,
report or memorandum - that an employee of the supplier "knew" about
and that the supplier nonetheless did not disclose to the finished product
manufacturer. In short, Cunningham's approach would still require a
"forced sale" of information - albeit on different terms. The dispropor-
tionate burden of forced gathering, interpreting, and transmitting of
information would remain."0 4 Hence, his solution does not appear
workable. A better approach is to apply the existing law that allows
multi-use component and raw material suppliers to sell their products
without also having to provide information about end-use-specific
applications.
The analysis in this Article also explains an apparent paradox
concerning the "contract specifications" defense. Although the multi-use
component and raw material principles discussed in this Article are far-
reaching, the "contract specifications" defense available to other kinds of
component suppliers is a relatively weak defense. At first glance, it would
seem that a component supplier who sells to specifications ought to have
as much legal protection as one who sells off-the-shelf. However, a
supplier who makes to-specification components is generally in a better
position both to gather information and to charge for it. Such a supplier
not only knows its customer's end-use, but can charge for information
regarding that end-use. Thus, it is logical for the "contract specifications"
defense to be narrower than the protection for multi-use component and
raw material suppliers." 5
04 One occasionally sees the statement in judicial opinions that the added cost of
providing a warning is negligible. See, e.g., Ross Lab. v. Thies, 725 P.2d 1076, 1079
(Alaska 1986) ("i.e., adding more printing to a label"); Macrie v. S.D.S. Biotech Corp.,
630 A.2d 805, 810 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (stating that since costs are usually
negligible, warnings should be required even if only a moderate gain is received by
society), cert. denied, 636 A.2d 52 (N.J. 1993). As several commentators have pointed
out, these statements are far too simplistic. "Overwarning" has costs, both because it
crowds out legitimate warnings, causing users to disregard them, and because it deters
some safe and proper uses of the product. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 99, at 296-
97. More generally, the real costs of warning are those of gathering information to
determine when, whether, and how to warn - so that "overwarning" does not occur.
105 Of course, there can be times when the contract specifications call for a multi-
purpose component or raw material, as in Childress v. Gresen Mfg. Co., 888 F.2d 45,48
(6th Cir. 1989). Under these circumstances, the supplier should be entitled to the benefits
of both defenses.
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The notion that a multi-use component or raw material supplier
need not warn of a "foreseeable" danger may seem troubling. But our
economy depends upon the availability of affordable basic components
and raw materials, unburdened by end-use specific warning require-
ments. To paraphrase an observation that has been made about product
liability warning law in a different context, requiring end-use-specific
warnings from suppliers would "preclude a sensible division of labor"
between suppliers and finished product manufacturers.106 Our case
law is replete with examples (many of them framed as "duty" cases)
where a party is not required to act even in the face of foreseeable
harm. 1
07
This policy discussion has been based on a law and economics model
of product liability law. Not surprisingly, however, the multi-use raw
material and component principles can also be justified under the more
philosophical "representational" theory of product liability warning law.
The representational theory holds that the mere sale of a product includes
implied representations about its safety.' Warnings are therefore
necessary to correct any false impressions.'0 9 However, when the raw
material or component is a commodity with many different applications,
it is difficult to conceive that the mere sale of that commodity includes
representations about its utility in a particular finished product. A seller
of a multi-use raw material or component arguably represents that it will
be safe to handle and hold, but not that it works well in a medical
implant or a log-splitter.
106 In RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 99 (1976), the author
makes this point about the deficiencies of a "simple foresight test" in determining when
suppliers of toxic, inherently dangerous chemicals should have a duty to warn remote
users of the same chemicals.
"o7 There is a whole body of case law on rescuers. Generally, tort law holds that there
is no duty to rescue, even if a minimal rescue effort would prevent a serious injury. See
POSNER, supra note 97, 131-33. According to Judge Posner, this rule can be justified
economically because parties would otherwise avoid situations (such as beaches) where
they might become rescuers. Id. at 132-33.
' See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962)
("Implicit in the machine's presence on the market ... was a representation that it would
safely do the jobs for which it was built.").
"0 This theory is discussed, for example, in EPSTEN, supra note 106, at 49; David
G. Owen, Products Liability: Principles ofJusticefor the 21st Century, 11 PACE L. REV.
63, 77-78 (1990) (stating that manufacturers should inform consumers about "predictable
risks from predictable uses"); Michael A. Pittenger, Note, Reformulating the Strict
Liability Failure to Warn, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1509, 1530-32 (1992) (explaining
that "consumer autonomy" is possible where the consumer is certain he is fully aware of
all risks).
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As has been noted, the academic literature suggests that theoretical
moorings for the existing limits on component and raw material supplier
liability are needed. For example, a recent article discusses the increasing
number of cases being brought against such suppliers."' The article
urges the recognition of an "ingredient supplier defense" that would
exonerate such suppliers as a matter of law."' The article correctly
distinguishes this defense from the existing bulk supplier/sophisticated
purchaser rules, which focus on repackaging of the product rather than its
conversion into a finished product by another company."2 Yet the
author of that article never satisfactorily explains which ingredient
suppliers should be entitled to this defense," 3 or why this defense is
appropriate." 4 To address these matters, some consideration of the
character of the ingredient (i.e., whether it is multi-purpose and safe for
normal handling or not) and of the problem of information costs is
necessary.
Taking a different view, another recent article criticizes the results in
the TMJ litigation and asks courts to apply a three-part test to upstream
supplier liability, focusing on the supplier's knowledge of the danger, the
length of the market chain between the supplier and the finished product
user, and the degree of alteration of the raw material or component.
115
Yet, apart from the fact that such a balancing test would provide little
practical guidance to judges and juries, Professor Hager never gives a
"' Charles E. Erway, III, The Ingredient Supplier Defense, 16 J. PRODS. & Toxics
LIAB. 269 (1994).
' Id. at 269.
1 2Id. at 290-91.
113 Erway does say at one point that an exception to his "ingredient supplier defense"
might exist if the ingredient "was not a standard commodity, but a very specialized
substance produced specifically for a particular end-product use." Id. at 294.1 14 Erway argues that the finished product "manufacturer is almost invariably
knowledgeable regarding its product and is the only one in a position to provide
appropriate product warnings." Id. at 297. However, as noted earlier, one can imagine
circumstances where that might not be true.
.. Mark M. Hager, Don't Say I Didn't Warn You (Even Though I Didn't): Why the
Pro-Defendant Consensus on WarningLaw Is Wrong, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1125, 1168-72
(1994). In his critique of the TMllitigation, ProfessorHager contends it was inappropriate
for DuPont to supply standard Teflon® raw materials to a medical implant manufacturer
given that the implant was not "provably safe" and that DuPont had not undertaken its
own medical research. Id. at 1128. He criticizes the succession of courts that have ruled
for DuPont as having done little to deter "future DuPonts." Id. To a large extent, Hager
appears to have misunderstood the facts in the TMJ litigation. He relies heavily on an old
unpublished Washington state court decision, whose "facts" have been discredited and
found to be unsupported in more recent published decisions. Id. at 1161-62.
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convincing explanation for why his standard should be adopted, other
than his subjective belief that existing law is too "pro-defendant." '" 6
Hence, his article as well fails to confront the problem of information
costs.
This Article will turn now to the interaction between the multi-use
raw material and component principles, the Second Restatement of Torts,
and the proposed Third Restatement.
Im. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE
LIMIT ON WARNING AND DESIGN CLAIMS
AND THE RESTATEMENT OF TOruS
A. The Second Restatement
While the Second Restatement of Torts did not expressly adopt the
multi-use component/raw material principles, the principles flow
implicitly from section 402A comment p, the so-called "substantial
change" comment. According to that comment, "[t]he question [of
liability] is essentially one of whether the responsibility for discovery and
prevention of the dangerous defect is shifted to the intermediate party
who is to make the changes."".7 Indeed, comment p's contrast between
pigiron, which is "capable of a wide variety of uses," and inherently
116 One suspects that few would share Professor Hager's subjective beliefs. Teflon®
fluoropolymers have been used by medical device manufacturers to fabricate a host of
life-saving medical implants from vascular grafts to artificial heart valves. See Klein v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 19 F.3d 997, 999 (5th Cir. 1994); In re TMJ Implants,
872 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Minn. 1995); Hoyt v. Vitek, Inc., 894 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Or. Ct.
App. 1995). According to Hager, before DuPont or any other company could supply
standard, off-the-shelf raw materials to a manufacturer of a medical device, the
supplier would have to determine that the device was "provably safe." Such an
approach would virtually dictate the end ofsalesto medical device manufacturers since (a)
devices are small, (b) the revenue derived from sales of raw materials to
device manufacturers is minuscule, and (c) determining the safety of another compa-
ny's medical device would be a very time-consuming, expensive process. The irony is
that, despite the succession of rulings in DuPont's favor, the sheer transaction
costs of the TMJ litigation have had the effect desired by Hager: raw material suppli-
ers have stopped selling to the medical device industry. See Barnaby J. Feder, Implant
Industry Is Facing Cutback by Top Suppliers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1994, at A4, D3;
Elyse Tanouye, Medical-ImplantFirms May Face Supply Shortages, WALL ST. J., Apr.
26, 1995, at B5; Pierre M. Galletti, Embargo on Biomaterials, 264 SCIENCE 1065
(1994).
117 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. p. (1965).
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dangerous raw coffee beans that have been contaminated with arsenic, is
precisely the point of this Article."' Some courts have even quoted
comment p in exonerating multi-use component or raw material
suppliers." 9 They have done so, moreover, without finding a physical
or chemical change, despite the fact that "substantial change" is the
ostensible subject of comment p. 20
Meanwhile, nothing in the negligence portions of the Restatement is
to the contrary. Section 388 of the Second Restatement of Torts is often
cited as the underpinning for negligence claims by finished product users
against raw material and component suppliers. These claims, however,
overlook the plain language of section 388: "One who supplies directly
or through a third person a chattel for another to use .... ."2 ' When a
raw material or component is being fabricated into something else, it is
not supplied directly or through a third person for another to use, rather,
it is supplied to a finished product manufacturer that makes a new
product. Thus, by its terms, section 388 of the Restatement was intended
to cover redistributed and repackaged chattels - not raw materials and
components converted into finished products before they reached the
plaintiff. 22 Indeed, the only examples given in the comments and
illustrations to section 388 are sales of finished products. Although a
number of courts have applied section 388 to component and raw
material suppliers,123 there is logic and precedent to the contrary. 24
"I Contrasting the two, comment p says that the pigiron supplier "is not so likely to
be held to strict liability when it turns out to be unsuitable for the child's tricycle into
which it is finally made by a remote buyer." Id.
.. See, e.g., Rynders v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 21 F.3d 835, 842 (8th Cir.
1994); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants, 887 F. Supp. 1463, 1467 (N.D. Ala. 1995); In
reTMJImplants, 872 F. Supp. 1019, 1025-26 (D. Minn. 1995); Cothrun v. Schwartz, 752
P.2d 1045, 1048 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Hoyt v. Vitek, Inc., 894 P.2d 1224, 1231 (Or. Ct.
App. 1995).
20 The title of comment p is actually, "Further processing or substantial change."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. p (1965) (emphasis added).
121 Id. § 388.
" Erway makes this point in his article. Erway, supra note 110, at 288 (§ 388 is not
particularly applicable to an ingredient supplier where the intermediary is not a mere
conduit).
.
23 See, e.g., Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008, 1012 (8th Cir. 1989)
(ethyl mercaptan); Adams v. Union Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 1453, 1457 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984) (toluene diisocyanate); Sara Lee Corp. v. Homasote, 719
F. Supp. 417, 420-21 (D. Md. 1989) (expandable polystyrene beads); Higgins v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1055, 1059-60 (D. Md. 1987) (glycol ether acetate).
,
24 In reTMJ Implants, 872 F. Supp. 1019, 1019 (D. Minn. 1995); Veil v. Vitek, Inc.,
803 F. Supp. 229, 233 (D.N.D. 1992) (raw materials are not equivalent to "chattels"). See
also Square D Co. v. Hayson, 621 So. 2d 1373, 1377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
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Perhaps most telling, section 388 and its comments are largely a replica
of the version of section 388 and comments thereto that appeared in the
1934 First Restatement. 25 It is difficult to believe that, at such an early
date in the development of tort law, the authors of the First Restatement
intended to endorse downstream warning liability for component and raw
material suppliers.'26
B. The Proposed Thini Restatement
Unfortunately, the current version of the proposed Third Restatement
of Torts: Products Liability, promulgated as "Tentative Draft No. 2" on
March 13, 1995, threatens to undermine this modus vivendi. While in
design defect and failure to warn cases it adopts a negligence-type
standard favored by defendants, 27 it also omits any equivalent of
Second Restatement of Torts section 402A comment p or any recognition
of the limits on liability of suppliers of multi-use raw materials and
component parts. "Substantial change" would thus be subsumed in the
questions of defect, causation, and plaintiff misuse. 28
These omissions are bad enough, but the potential news for compo-
nent and raw material suppliers gets even worse. Tentative Draft No. 2
of the proposed Restatement suggests that component parts and raw
materials are subject to the same liability rules and standards of "de-
fect" as finished products:
Component parts are products .... Raw materials are products ....
Frequently, plaintiffs join sellers of raw materials in actions against
those who subsequently combined those materials to create defective
products. Unless the raw materials are defective when sold under the
rules stated in §§ 1 and 2 [i.e., rules for finished products] the sellers
thereof are not liable. 29
(suggesting that § 388 is limited to inherently dangerous instrumentalities).
'2 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 388 (1934).
1
26 The comments to §§ 395 and 396 in both the First and the Second Restatements
expressly provide that sellers of negligently manufactured raw materials or components
can be liable to finished product users. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 395
cmt. m, 396 cmt. c (1965); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 395 cmt. f, 396 cmt. c (1934).
This is the current law as to defectively manufactured components/raw materials.
However, none of the comments to § 388 in either Restatement say anything about either
raw material or component supplier liability.
'27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b), (c) (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995).
128 Id. cmt. o; id. § 4, cmt. b, reporter's note.
29
.d § 4 cmt. b.
1995-961
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
This assertion is followed by a survey of case law in the reporter's
note that can only be described as selective and misleading.13 For
example, the survey does not mention Childress, Crossfield, or Fleck. It
does not cite any of the nineteen published decisions holding DuPont, as
a supplier of multi-purpose fluoropolymer raw materials, not liable as a
matter of law to the users of TMJ implants containing those raw
materials.' Instead, the survey relies predominantly upon cases from
the 1960s and 1970s involving defectively manufactured components or
raw materials,132 inherently dangerous materials, 33 or single-use com-
ponents.' To support its claim that "[c]ourts have also held manufac-
turers of such raw materials as sheet metal or plastics strictly liable for
any defects therein," the survey cites mostly decisions that found for the
defendant. 135
130 Id. reporter's note.
' The only TMJ case cited in Tentative Draft No. 2 is an early denial of DuPont's
summary judgment motion that was later overruled. Hegna v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 806 F. Supp. 822 (D. Minn. 1992), modifiedto grant summaryjudgment on all
claims, 825 F. Supp. 880 (D. Minn. 1993), aff'd, 27 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam), cited in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. h,
reporter's note (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
132 See Housman v. C.A. Dawson & Co., 245 N.E.2d 886, 887 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969)
(board contained "knot cluster"); Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 305 N.E.2d
750, 753 (N.Y. 1973) (rotted and split lumber plank); Burbage v. Boiler Eng'g & Supply
Co., 249 A.2d 563, 566-67 (Pa. 1969) (indentation in face of valve); see also supra note
15 and accompanying text.
'
33 See Union Supply Co. v. Post, 583 P.2d 276, 282 (Colo. 1978) (conveyor with nip
point had inherent danger); First Nat'l Bank v. Nor-Am Agric. Prod., Inc., 537 P.2d 682,
687 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. deniedsub nom. New Mexico Mill & Elevator Co., 536 P.2d
1085 (N.M. 1975) (highly toxic mercury-based fungicide); see also supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
,14 See Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1128 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 916 (1979) (specialized electroplating machine); Bradford v. Bendix-Westing-
house, 517 P.2d 406, 409-10 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (brake pedal assembly); see also
supra note 40 and accompanying text.
135 See Prather v. Upjohn Co., 797 F.2d 923, 927 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (affirming directed
verdict for supplier of polyurethane foam); Smith v. Borg-Warner Corp., 626 F.2d 384,
386 (5th Cir. 1980) (affirming jury verdict for supplier of thermoplastic raw material);
Davis v. Wells Aluminum Southeast, Inc., 323 S.E.2d 215, 216 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)
(affirming summary judgment on the ground that defendant did not manufacture the
aluminum strip). The other two cases cited by the reporter's note are Hastings v. Dis Tran
Prod., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 1352, 1355-56 (W.D. La. 1975) (considering the availability of
a contributory negligence defense in a products liability case, not whether the defendant's
strap was a "product"); and Seegers Grain v. U.S. Steel Corp., 577 N.E.2d 1364, 1365-66
(Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 140 (Ill. 1991) (involving an inherently
defective steel plate); see also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Thus, by disregarding the entire line of multi-use component and raw
material cases, and overstating the holdings of the cases that it does cite,
Tentative Draft No. 2 could enshrine the erroneous principle that
component and raw material suppliers generally have duties to design and
warn product end-users. That may be the outcome desired by the authors
of the draft, but it is certainly not an accurate statement of current law.
Typical of the approach taken by Tentative Draft No. 2 of the
proposed Restatement is its treatment of Menna v Johns-Manville
Corp.,136 a New Jersey decision denying summary judgment to suppli-
ers of raw asbestos fibers. While the reporter's note cites Menna, it
ignores the court's analysis. In Menna, the court relied on Second
Restatement of Torts section 402A comment p to conclude that the
defendants' fibers more closely resembled raw coffee beans contaminated
with arsenic than pigiron, because mined and milled asbestos remains
hazardous to the user regardless of the degree of processing to which it
is subjected.1 37 Thus, Menna in no way supports the view that raw
material and component suppliers should be subject to the same liability
standards as finished product manufacturers; to the contrary, it draws
the same distinction as this Article has made between suppliers of raw
materials and components that have many safe end-uses and suppliers of
raw materials and components that are dangerous for their ordinary
uses.
At the May 1995 meeting of the American Law Institute Council,
some dissatisfaction was expressed with Tentative Draft No. 2's treat-
ment of raw material suppliers. Apparently, a revision is being considered
for 1996, with some scholars advocating that the concepts of section
402A comment p be retained. In any event, before the new product
liability Restatement provisions are enacted in final form, much more
serious attention needs to be given to the question of component part and
raw material supplier liability. In cases like Childress and Crossfield,
courts have been reaching the right results. It would be unfortunate if the
Third Restatement undid that.
It is probably not a coincidence that the principal drafters of the new
Restatement have also written a critique of product liability warning law
that overlooks the thorny issues of component and raw material supplier
liability.3 In their landmark article, Professors Henderson and Twerski
1 6 585 F. Supp. 1178 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd without opinion, 772 F.2d 895 (3d Cir.
1985).
37 Id. at 1182-83.
138 Henderson & Twerski, supranote 99, at 298. Professors Henderson and Twerski's
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first condemn existing warning law for deviating too far from a negli-
gence standard.'39 Insisting that even a negligence standard is too
favorable to plaintiffs, the authors urge the courts to adopt additional
reforms. 4 ' The additional "reforms," however, largely amount to
having courts vigorously enforce a negligence approach.
14
'
But, as this Article has noted, there are times when even a negligence
standard, i.e., one that balances likelihood and severity of harm against
prevention costs, can be inadequate. Henderson and Twerski concede this,
although they offer no concrete alternative. For example, they say that for
a manufacturer to be liable, not only must the manufacturer be negligent
but its product "must in some sense of the word, 'create' the risk."'1
4
What Henderson and Twerski mean by this terminology is not entirely
clear. One could interpret their language to mean that multi-use compo-
nents and raw materials do not "create the risk" when another company
uses them to fabricate a defective finished product. It would be clearer,
though, simply to follow the existing law that focuses on whether the
component or raw material is inherently dangerous or defective or not. If
more recent article proposing a specific revision of § 402A suffers from the same
problems. James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section
402A of The Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512 (1992). In that
article, the authors relegate the issues of"misuse, modification, and alteration" to a single
paragraph, arguing that they can simply be treated as questions of "proximate cause." Id.
at 1545-46. It is ironic that Henderson and Twerski, who are generally advocates of
greater certainty and predictability in tort law and of greater judicial assertiveness, want
to sweep the questions of "misuse, modification, and alteration," for which some specific
legal standards have developed, into the jury closet of "proximate cause."
139 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 99, at 271-89.
140 Id. at 311-26.
141 Much of what Henderson and Twerski say in the last section of their article is
simply a pep talk for judges. For example, they ask judges to "rethink older patterns of
decisionmaking," id. at 313, to "direct[ ] verdicts more readily in unworthy cases," id.,
to "begin adopting a hardheaded attitude," id. at 314, to develop a "judicial mind-set...
that does not allow sending such marginal claims into the relatively unfettered hands of
ajury," id. at 317, to "approach [specificity-of-warning] cases with healthy skepticism,"
id. at 319, and to "engage more aggressively in both lawmaking and law-applying." Id.
at 326. Their only remaining suggestions relate to increased deference to agencies and
experts. Id. at 319-25. Thus, apart from the universal adoption of a negligence standard
in product liability failure-to-warn cases advocated in the first part of the article, the
authors really have no doctrinal solutions to the problems raised in their article.
In Michael S. Jacobs, Toward a Process-BasedApproach to Failure-to-Warn Law,
71 N.C. L. REV. 121, 166-72 (1992), the author also criticizes the Henderson and Twerski
article. While Professor Jacobs' focus is somewhat different from that of this Article, he
too concludes that their proposals are ultimately unsatisfying.
142 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 99, at 284.
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courts have not been sufficiently "hard-headed" in applying a negligence
standard, as Henderson and Twerski suggest, then perhaps the solution
lies in a different legal standard that enables courts to be "hard-headed."
The real problem may not be the negligence standard itself, but a
difficulty in incorporating information costs into that standard. A true
"negligence" standard that took into account the costs of acquiring,
evaluating, and passing on information would probably lead to socially
appropriate outcomes. If courts and juries really could consider what it
costs a supplier of a versatile raw material or component to gather and
process the information necessary to provide appropriate end-use-specific
warnings for all uses of the material, and then weigh those costs against
the social utility of access to affordable raw materials, they would not
require suppliers to warn. Too often, however, courts and juries act as if
the costs of obtaining information are nonexistent and as if the only
relevant cost is that of taking the precaution. 143 As at least one com-
mentator has pointed out, "the incentive to exercise care may be socially
excessive."'" In practical terms, it means that the availability of multi-
use components and raw materials would unduly decline if their suppliers
were subjected to a conventional negligence standard as it has been
customarily applied.145 If a substitute for negligence liability exists that
will lead to predictable, fair, and socially appropriate results, it should be
used. The multi-use component/raw material principles are such a proxy.
While there was much academic criticism of the negligence standard
during the 1960s, it now appears to be enjoying a revival. 46 If all
approaches to tort law are imperfect, at least "fault" has a moral
143 Otherwise stated, factfmders often take a two-step approach to negligence
problems. First, they determine whether the defendant "knew" or "should have known"
the risk or danger. Then, if the answer to the first inquiry is yes, they determine whether
the costs of inaction in the face of this risk or danger outweighed the costs of action. If
so, the defendant is liable. The problem with this two-step approach is that the second
calculation includes all the costs to others of the risk, but only part of the defendant's
costs of eliminating the risk. The costs of obtaining actual knowledge, of translating
"should have known" into "known," are omitted.
'" Steven Shavell, Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information About Risk, 21
J. LEGAL STuD. 259, 269 (1992). As Professor Shavell points out, one can really conceive
of several different "negligence" standards, each of which takes a different approach to
information costs. Id. at 260-61.
145 See Barnaby J. Feder, Implant Industry Is Facing Cutback by Top Suppliers, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1994, at Al, D3.
146 In addition to Henderson and Twerski's writings, see David G. Owen, The Fault
Pit, 26 GA. L. REv. 703, 710, 723 (1992) (arguing that strict liability is an "experi-
ment" that has failed and is in decline, and for the inevitability of a fault-based
standard).
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resonance to it.'47 Yet it should be remembered that strict liability was
originally justified in part as a shortcut to proving negligence.' 48 Under
this view, negligence may have been regarded as an appropriate universal
standard in an ideal world, but strict liability was needed because
sometimes negligence could not be proved. However, the opposite is also
true: at times the burden of proof in a negligence case is too easily met
- i.e., when the true costs of obtaining and analyzing information are
undervalued. In these circumstances, shortcuts to non-liability, such as the
multi-use component and raw material rule, are also appropriate.
Courts have grappled with section 402A for a generation. Deciding
real-life cases, they have in many instances arrived at satisfactory
outcomes. As this section of the Article has tried to demonstrate, the
wholesale revision of section 402A in Tentative Draft No. 2 of the
proposed Third Restatement may have at least one unintended conse-
quence; it may muddy some previously clear waters in the area of
component and raw material supplier liability. It would be far better, in
this author's view, to limit the scope of change to those areas where the
authors of the Third Restatement have proved their case. 149 At a
minimum, either comment p, or something similar, should be retained in
the Third Restatement. Preferably, limits on component and raw material
supplier liability should be expressly recognized.
On November 15, 1995, as this Article was being finalized for
publication, the American Law Institute issued an internal "Council
Draft" which proposes the addition of a new comment on component and
raw material supplier liability.5 ' The comment would provide that
components are not defectively designed when the component seller did
not have "substantial control over the design of the final, assembled
product."'' The comment would also provide that component sellers
147 Id. at 718-19.
148 See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1972)
(explaining that the purpose of California's pioneering efforts in the field of strict
liability was to relieve a plaintiff from problems of proof inherent in pursuing negli-
gence).
149 For example, the need for proof of an alternative design in design defect cases and
the elimination of the "hindsight" rule in warning cases. Even here, one can make a good
case that the Third Restatement would simply codify the rule that prevails in most
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, A Model of Products LiabilityReform, 27 VAL.
U. L. REv. 637, 659 (1993) (pointing out that the "state-of-the-art defense is the law in
the United States").
"' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. o (Council Draft
No. 3, 1995).
151 id.
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do not "ordinarily" have a duty to warn end-users.152 Regarding raw
materials, the comment takes an even stronger position. It states that
viable defective design and warning claims against raw material suppliers
should be even rarer because of the "large comparative advantage"
possessed by finished product manufacturers in design and warning
matters. 53 This comment is followed by illustrations which appear to
be loosely based on the Crossfield,14 In re Silicone Gel Breast Im-
plants,'55 and Fleck decisions,'56 and by a reporter's note which, for
the first time, includes citations to many of the multi-use component/raw
material cases.
While this Council Draft represents a vast improvement over
Tentative Draft No. 2 of the proposed Restatement, further room for
improvement remains. The new comment tries to retain the position that
raw material and component suppliers are subject to the same liability
standards as finished product manufacturers, even as much of its analysis
undercuts that view. Thus, unlike comment p to section 402A of the
Second Restatement, the new comment does not reach the underlying rule
of law. Moreover, one of the new comment's illustrations suggests that,
contrary to the case law and the information costs analysis in this Article,
holding a multi-purpose raw material supplier liable for failing to warn
about an end-use-specific danger may be appropriate under some
circumstances.' 57
In early December 1995, the American Law Institute discussed this
Council Draft and, it has been reported, considered further changes to
clarify the existing protections for raw material and component suppliers.
This development is encouraging.
CONCLUSION
Through the concepts of "duty" and "proximate cause," the law of
torts has always limited the number of potential defendants that can be
152 1d.
53 d.
"5 Crossfield v. Quality Control Equip. Co., 1 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 1993). See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. o, illus. 1 (Council
Draft No. 3, 1995).
'5 887 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Ala. 1995). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. o, illus. 2 (Council Draft No. 3, 1995).
156 Fleckv. KDI Sylvan Pools, 981 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 123 L.Ed.2d
267 (1993). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. o, illus.
4 (Council Draft No. 3, 1995).
'
57 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. o, illus. 3
(Council Draft No. 3, 1995).
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held liable for an injury. To paraphrase the most famous example of these
limits, a railroad is not liable for debris that falls on a passenger because
one of its employees negligently pushed another employee causing
another passenger's package of fireworks to drop. 5 8 That chain of
events is simply too attenuated, and allowing recovery in such circum-
stances would deter too much activity.
The point of this Article is that similar limits must exist - and do
exist - within the compact world of a single finished product. Most
products are comprised of many components and raw materials, which in
turn are comprised of other raw materials and components. Hence, one
can imagine a potentially indefinite chain of liability descending to the
most basic materials used to formulate a finished product. To forestall
this possibility, courts have uniformly held that suppliers of raw materials
and components should not be liable to users of other companies'
finished products, unless the raw material or component presents a danger
for most or all end-uses. This largely unstated rule has worked well, and
should be preserved in any revision of product liability law.
158 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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